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The delivery of mixed communities in the regeneration of urban waterfronts: 
an investigation of the comparative experience of Plymouth and Bristol 
Abstract  
The raison d’être of spatial planning is to secure public benefits or goods through the 
regulation of private development. Under neoliberalism, where economic growth is 
privileged over community interests, the ability of planning to deliver public goods 
can be compromised. The aim of this research was to investigate the delivery of 
mixed communities in the regeneration of waterfront sites in two outwardly 
comparable, but in detail, rather different port cities, namely Plymouth and Bristol. 
The range of dwelling types, extent of affordable housing and associated 
practicalities of delivery were evaluated using planning application data, 2000-2017 
and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholder groups (local planning authority 
[LPA] officers, developers, land agents and politicians).  
The results indicate that there is a standard ‘model’ of delivery for port regeneration 
with city centre harbour-side land yielding high density apartment developments and 
with houses becoming the prevelent house type in suburban waterfront locations. 
Planning policies for social mixing have not, in general, been successfully 
implemented in waterfront sites due to the greater priority afforded to development 
viability and the political pressure to unlock and accelerate economic growth. The 
exception to these findings was where public land had been used. For both cities, 
just two per cent of the dwellings delivered on privately procured sites were 
affordable housing units compared to over 25% on public land. This paper highlights 
the effect of neoliberalisation on the English planning system, which enables 
developers to acquire sites without regard to local development plan policies. Such 
policies allow developers and landowners to negate planning obligations to provide 
affordable housing to the detriment of public good and trust in the system.  
 
HIGHLIGHTS: 
 Standard ‘model’ for city centre waterfront regeneration is high density 
apartment development 
 Delivery of affordable housing is compromised by political pressures to unlock 
economic growth  
 Developers can negate planning obligations on the basis of development 
viability 
 Exceptions possible on public land, through public subsidy or on sites with 
economies of scale 
 Basis of planning transformed by enabling developers to avoid policy-
compliant development 
KEY WORDS: Mixed communities; urban renaissance; waterfront regeneration; 
planning obligations. 
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The delivery of mixed communities in the regeneration of urban waterfronts: 
an investigation of the comparative experience of Plymouth and Bristol 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Since 2000, as part of the urban renaissance agenda, UK planning policy has sought 
to promote sustainable ‘mixed communities’, consisting of developments of market-
priced and affordable housing as a model of a more integrated, egalitarian, balanced 
and connected society (DCLG, 2010; Colomb, 2007). These high density 
developments, often on brownfield land, have become common in many inner urban 
areas, although the delivered reality of mixed communities is often contested. This 
delivery is placed into sharp focus in waterfront locations, where the sales premiums 
attached to such sites, together with abnormal costs associated with the remediation 
of ground contamination and flood mitigation, can affect viability and reduce the 
scope for land value capture for ‘public good’ from planning conditions and 
obligations. The increasing political prominence given to development viability and 
the delivery of economic growth after the 2008 recession has arguably reduced the 
ability of planning to secure wider public goods, such as affordable housing. This 
emphasis has far-reaching implications for urban land use and the associated 
equitable outcomes of planning decisions.    
The aim of this research was to investigate the delivery of mixed communities in the 
regeneration of waterfront sites in two port cities, Plymouth and Bristol. While these 
two cities might appear outwardly comparable, their economies are very different, 
which affects the strength of the market and the ability to deliver public goods, such 
as affordable housing, from new development. The objectives of the study were: first, 
to establish the range of dwelling types delivered on waterfront regeneration sites 
using data compiled from relevant planning applications, 2000-2017; second, to 
understand the factors influencing the delivery of affordable housing in waterfront 
developments using planning application data and semi-structured interviews with 
key stakeholder groups (local planning authority [LPA] officers, developers, land 
agents and politicians); and third, to evaluate different attitudes and approaches to 
social mixing in waterfront regeneration sites using the semi-structured interviews. 
The research found that the UK planning system has a reduced capacity to deliver 
4 
 
mixed communities because of the political priorities for economic growth, which 
have enabled developers to negate planning obligations on the basis of development 
viability. Arguably, the basis of the planning system in England has been 
fundamentally undermined by enabling developers to avoid policy-compliant 
development. The only exceptions are where affordable housing has been provided 
on public land, through public subsidy or on larger sites with economies of scale. 
The paper therefore connects to broader debates about how planning and land use 
policy plays an important supporting role in the delivery of neoliberal competitiveness 
and neoliberal spatial governance (Boland, 2014; Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013; 
Sager, 2011; 2015). In planning, neoliberalism refers to the minimisation of state 
intervention and regulation of the market to stimulate enterprise and 
entrepreneurialism (‘roll-back’ of the late 1970s and 1980s); market supportive forms 
and modes of state governance to facilitate the accumulation of capital and a 
reinforcement of neoliberalism as a hegemonic discourse (‘roll-out’ of the 1990s and 
2000s); and the adaptive regimes and experimentation forms following the economic 
crisis after 2008 (‘roll-with-it’ or ‘roiling’ neoliberalism) (Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2013, p.11). Five key issues and debates emerge from the shift of planning acting as 
a regulator to an enabler of development, which this paper intends to contribute 
through its analysis of the delivery of affordable housing as a ‘public good’ in Bristol 
and Plymouth.  
The first debate is whether planning, as an independent regulatory function, can 
continue to deliver ‘public good’ under a neoliberal regime, where competitiveness is 
privileged over community interests (Boland, 2014; Haughton, et al., 2013; Claydon 
and Smith, 1997). Some have argued that ‘planning had betrayed its wider public 
ethos and had acted in a duplicitous way to facilitate growth’ (Allmendinger, 2016, 
p.16) and that planners have become the ‘handmaidens of neoliberalism’ (Sager, 
2013, p. xxiii). Second, the implementation of planning under this regime is subject to 
considerable experimentation, based on different or changing economic 
circumstances, local discretion, resistance and alternative pathways, which creates 
temporal, spatial and sectoral variegation of planning practice (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2013). Third, neoliberalisation encourages consensus-based policies, 
such as communicative planning, spatial planning, sustainable development and 
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even urban renaissance, which tend to stifle critical debate and the consideration of 
alternative pathways, which some have labelled as ‘post-political’ (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2011). Fourth, under these altered conditions, the trust that various 
stakeholders have in the planning system and its values can change, with long-term 
implications for subsequent interpersonal relations and interactions between the 
public and private sectors as well as the general public (Tait, 2012). Fifth, while 
beyond the scope of this paper, the unequal effects of these neoliberal planning 
practices can contribute to debates about social justice in the city (Harvey, 1973), the 
‘Right to the City’ (Harvey, 2012) and the ‘Just City’ (Fainstein, 2014), especially in 
relation to which groups experience public benefits from development and planning 
decisions. 
 
2.0 Mixed communities in waterfront regeneration 
Since the 1980s, the waterfront has become a focal point for intensified planning 
intervention and urban regeneration (Boland et al., 2017). Urban decline linked to the 
globalisation of trade, changing sea-transportation technologies and 
deindustrialisation have resulted in the widespread dereliction and deprivation in port 
cities during the late twentieth century (Tallon, 2013; Mackinnon and Cumbers, 2007; 
Leger et al., 2016). The collapse of Fordism in the UK during the 1970s and the 
emergence of neoliberal orthodoxy resulted in an evolution of urban policy in which 
post-war Keynesian policies of state regulation and interventionism were replaced by 
those targeting economic growth and competitiveness through the deregulation of 
state intervention. Since the 1980s, successive governments have recognised the 
potential of large-scale urban regeneration projects, including those on the 
waterfront, for creating jobs and delivering growth. Port cities have been in the 
vanguard of neoliberal urban regeneration programmes since the 1980s, including 
Urban Development Corporations, City Challenge and the Single Regeneration 
Budget, which represented ‘rolled-back’ state intervention and deregulation to 
encourage enterprise through business-led initiatives and partnerships albeit 
involving considerable public expenditure. 
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These approaches have been criticised because of their failure to deliver public good 
to all demographic groups in society and their tendency to create gentrification and 
to be socially divisive. Urban development projects are risky and depend on the 
realisation of future rents. They therefore tend to target high-income segments of 
society at the expense of less affluent social groups (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
Urban regeneration projects  privilege restaurants, cafes, hotels and high-end 
housing primarily for young, professional, affluent and childless groups (Tallon, 
2013). Most urban development projects therefore accentuate social polarisation 
through increases in land/rental values and the displacement of low-income 
households (i.e. gentrification), which illustrate the contested nature of public good 
delivered through this approach. 
The New Labour administration, which came into power in 1997, placed ‘social 
exclusion’ at the heart of its policy discourse in response to decades of urban decline 
and a sense that the property-led regeneration programmes of the previous 
administraton had not delivered positive change for the most disadvantaged 
(Macleavy, 2006). New Labour saw concentrations of poverty as the source of social 
exclusion and adopted policies to deconcentrate poverty and bring the middle 
classes back into the inner city, based on Lord Roger’s Urban Task Force report, 
Towards an Urban Renaissance (Rogers and Coaffee, 2005; Colomb, 2007). Their 
urban policy had two key agendas: tackling social exclusion in the poorest areas 
through its ‘neighbourhood renewal’ programmes; and delivering a design-led ‘urban 
renaissance’ to encourage physical, aesthetic and economic regeneration 
(Cochrane, 2007).  
Enshrined within both agendas was the concept of ‘mixed communities’, defined as 
“new sustainable urban realms, founded upon the principles of social mixing […] with 
the express aim of attracting the suburban knowledge and service industrial 
demographic back to the city” (Rogers and Coaffee, 2005, p. 323; Urban Task Force, 
1999). The report acknowledged that poor quality housing and imbalances in tenure 
and household incomes were a key factor in the decline of many deprived 
neighbourhoods (Urban Task Force, 1999). The report recommended a fine-grained 
social mix with tenure options at “urban block, street and neighbourhood level, in a 
way that does not distinguish tenure by grouping or house type.” The ‘mixed 
communities’ approach refers to the diversification of new and existing housing 
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developments by promoting a range of house types and tenures to create integrated 
and egalitarian societies in which space, services and facilities are shared by people 
of all social classes and incomes (Table 1) (DCLG, 2010).  
Advocates of social mixing assumed that demographic change would increase life 
chances and living conditions for deprived groups, and promote more stable and 
cohesive communities (Bolt, et al., 2010; Colomb, 2007). It is assumed that more 
affluent groups are able to garner greater public investment; encourage a stronger 
local economy; and bring networks and contacts to create ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ 
social capital for the benefit of the poor in areas of concentrated poverty (Lees, 
2008). The influx of affluent classes can act as ‘role models’, in terms of behaviour 
and aspirations, to reduce socio-spatial segregation. In this way, the social milieu 
resulting from the spatial concentration of poverty and its neighbourhood effects, 
which reinforces aspects of disadvantage and actively reduces an individual’s ability 
to move out of poverty or disadvantage, can be broken down (Randolph and Wood, 
2003, iii). The principles of mixed communities became enshrined within planning 
policy (PPG3, DETR, 2000), urban design guidance (HCA, 2000) and the 
sustainable communities agenda (ODPM, 2003) and has become an “unquestioned 
gospel” in planning policy circles (Lees, 2008, p. 2450), which has remained a firmly 
embedded credo of British housing and planning policy (Bond, et al., 2011; Lupton 
and Crispin, 2009; Lees, 2003).  
However, there is little evidence to suggest that mixed tenure residential 
developments result in increased interactions between different income groups 
(Cheshire, 2007, 2009; Allen et al., 2005; van Beckhoven and van Kempen, 2003; 
Kearns and Mason, 2013). The approach enshrines the rather uncomfortable 
undertones of a ‘moralistic discourse’, whereby the poor are dependent upon the 
more affluent classes. Instead, social mixing can create tensions between groups 
causing residents to withdraw rather than mix (Rose, 2004; Goodchild and Cole, 
2001), and there are arguments suggesting that low income groups may be better off 
living in homogenous communities that have access to more affordable shops and 
public services (DCLG, 2010). Indeed, social mixing and cohesion are more likely to 
be achieved in socially homogenous neighbourhoods (Butler and Robson, 2003). As 
a result, scholars have argued that social mixing is an euphemism for state-led 
gentrification, which is widely perceived as a negative process that exacerbates 
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social exclusion and is associated with ‘roll-out’ neoliberal competitiveness 
(Davidson, 2008; Lees et al., 2007; Atkinson, 2004; Cameron, 2003; Arthurson, et al. 
2015). 
The implementation of the mixed communities concept under neoliberal spatial 
governance is also problematic because development applications are subject to 
interaction between private developers and planners, usually involving the re-
negotiation of priorities established in national and local planning policy.  In urban 
regeneration schemes, private developers seek to negotiate with LPAs to provide as 
few affordable housing units as possible due to reduced sales revenues for 
affordable units and spill over effects on market-valued homes for sale. Affordable 
housing and tenants are often stigmatised through prejudice relating to behaviour, 
fear of crime, poor property maintenance and concerns from private purchasers 
regarding re-sale values. Private developers have to be aware of and respond to the 
perceived attitudes and preferences of house buyers. Therefore, the challenge for 
developers is to include affordable housing on a scale judged to exert minimal effect 
on the end value of market homes (Tiesdell, 2004).  
Private developers and Registered Providers of social housing (RPs) (also known as 
housing associations) prefer segregation or integrated clusters to minimise the 
number of market units adjoining affordable homes and to reduce management 
costs. Where the quantum of affordable housing exceeds 25%, or where the tenure 
favours rented affordable housing, developers prefer segregation strategies as the 
perception from home buyers is that someone with equity in a property (for example, 
shared ownership tenants) will maintain their property better than somebody in 
rented accommodation (Tiesdell, 2004). Segregation strategies are more likely 
where there is a large value gap between market and affordable housing; the 
registered providers need to maximise value; and the perceived need of house 
purchasers to differentiate market homes.  
These segregation strategies are particularly relevant for high value waterfront sites. 
Research by Knight Frank (2015) revealed that waterfront residential properties in 
the UK are worth on average 70% more than their inland counterparts.  Positive site 
features, such as waterfront views, add little value to affordable housing units as 
rents for affordable/social properties are regulated by Homes England (formerly the 
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Homes and Communities Agency [HCA]). Therefore, registered providers often 
prefer to acquire more units of lesser ‘nominal’ quality (i.e. less desirable location, 
less kerb appeal, fewer parking spaces, smaller gardens or smaller units) rather than 
fewer units of higher ‘nominal’ quality (Tiesdell, 2004). The challenge to LPAs is 
therefore to secure policy levels of affordable housing with a representative mix of 
dwellings types that are distributed across sites.  
Development viability has emerged as an increasingly important material 
consideration in the planning system and it presents a significant barrier to the 
delivery of mixed communities (McAllister, 2017). Planning obligations are the main 
mechanism by which communities can capture part of the uplift in land value 
generated by the granting of planning permission and they are the principal method 
for delivering affordable housing as a public good. According to the DCLG (2017, 
p.5), Section 106 agreements were the most common delivery mechanism for all 
affordable tenures in 2016-17, providing c. 18,000 affordable houses (43%) with the 
second most common mechanism being housing association direct delivery (12,000; 
29%). Where planning applications do not comply with planning policy, financial 
viability tests are increasingly being used to calculate the amount of obligations that 
can be met by a development. Viability appraisals test the ability of a development to 
meet its costs, including planning obligations, while ensuring an appropriate site 
value for the landowner and a market adjusted return to the developer (RICS, 2012). 
Increasingly, developers are looking to the planning system to de-risk their schemes, 
so that within development appraisals/viability tests, profit is taken as a fixed element 
whereas, in practice, it should be a variable element (i.e. an out-turn of 
development).  Landowners will seek to maximise their returns – and generally will 
not accept risk – which means that land purchase cost also becomes a fixed element 
in the equation. Consequently, the negotiable elements in this equation become land 
value capture and the size and quality of the housing product delivered to the 
consumer.  
Development viability has been a planning consideration since at least 1998 when 
Circular 6/98: Planning and Affordable Housing stated that LPAs should consider the 
needs of developers for schemes to be financially viable. However, formal modelling 
of development viability as part of the development management process did not 
begin until 2005 (McAllister, 2017). Viability testing has become increasingly 
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embedded in planning as both the Coalition and the Conservative governments 
since 2010 have demonstrated more sympathy towards the interests of landowners 
and developers and a weakened commitment to affordable housing delivery 
(McAllister, 2017). For example, Paragraph 173 of the original version of the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG: 2012: p. 41) stated:  
“To ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to 
development, such as requirements for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure 
contributions or other requirements should, when taking account of the normal cost 
of development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner 
and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable” (DCLG, 2012: p. 
41). 
Furthermore, paragraph 205 of the NPPF (DCLG, 2012: p. 47) stated: 
“Where obligations are being sought or revised, local planning authorities should 
take account of changes in market conditions over time and, wherever appropriate, 
be sufficiently flexible to prevent planned development being stalled”. 
Similarly, the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 ensured that the quantity of 
affordable housing is the only obligation that can be reduced on previously approved 
planning permissions that are not economically viable (McAllister, 2017). In 2013, 
changes to permitted development rights allowed the conversion of office space to 
residential use with zero affordable housing (McAllister, et al., 2018). The Vacant 
Building Credit (2014) also enabled developers to reduce the requirement to provide 
affordable housing based on vacant space brought back into productive use 
(McAllister, 2017). Together with viability testing, these are examples of ‘roll-with-it’ 
neoliberalisation, where market supportive mechanisms are introduced to encourage 
development in the otherwise challenging economic circumstances of a recession.  
Viability modelling is, of course, “saturated with intrinsic uncertainty” and there are 
clear incentives for developers and landowners to bias calculations (McAllister, 2017, 
p.122). There are two very different views about whether the price paid for land 
should be used to justify reduced affordable housing contributions. The first argues 
that existing use value should be the starting point in appraisals, while the other 
argues that, in order to ensure that land comes forward for development, market 
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evidence (i.e. the price for which land is transacting in the market) should be utilised. 
It is widely acknowledged that developers have ‘gamed’ viability tests in order to 
reduce obligations to provide non-market housing (McAllister, et al., 2018). Hill 
(2015, p. 22) states that LPAs often fail to defend their policies because of “a mix of 
a lack of skill and experience in the face of better resourced developers and more 
aggressive property professionals and negotiators, as well as naivety, and lack of 
political will”. Viability tests are not usually made available to the public as they are 
impenetrable to all but highly trained surveyors and planners. Viability can be very 
sensitive to small changes made to developments costs and sales values 
(McAllister, 2007). Therefore, developers can estimate costs conservatively with 
large contingencies to negate or reduce the requirement to provide affordable 
housing (McAllister, 2017) and so undermine the delivery of public good, such as 
affordable housing. Research for Shelter has estimated that, since viability 
assessments became accepted practice after the original NPPF was published in 
2012, the delivery of affordable homes by Section 106 agreements has fallen from 
27,000 homes pa (52%) over the period 2007-12 to 17,000 pa (38%) over the period 
2012-16 (Grayston, 2017, pp.12-13). These data clearly illustrate that the ability of 
planning to deliver public good has been affected by the privileging of the viability 
considerations of developers within the planning process. 
 
3.0 Selection of case study cities 
This paper utilises Plymouth and Bristol to assess whether the concept of mixed 
communities is applicable to waterfront housing regeneration under neoliberal spatial 
governance. Both cities are located in Southwest England, approximately 121 miles 
apart, and have undergone significant waterfront regeneration over the past 20 to 30 
years in response to the decline of port and military activities. The ongoing 
regeneration projects in these port cities ensure that there were plentiful waterfront 
housing developments to study. 
Bristol is one of the ten UK ‘core cities’ and is regarded as relatively economically 
successful in the UK context (Tallon, 2007). According to the Centre for Cities 
(2016), Bristol is the only core city with a gross value added (GVA) per capita more 
than the UK average. The city possesses easy access to London and the South East 
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as well as a densely populated and wealthy hinterland. Plymouth, on the other hand, 
is geographically more peripheral and has a more sparsely populated hinterland. It 
underperforms economically and scores within the bottom ten of UK cities for the 
number of businesses, new business start-ups and private sector jobs (Centre for 
Cities, 2016). The average (mean) house price in Bristol is £290,197, which is 57% 
higher than in Plymouth, where the average home costs £184,665 (National Housing 
Federation, 2018). Higher residential sales values in Bristol create opportunities for 
greater land value capture through Community Infrastructure Levy, Section 106 and 
affordable housing. Therefore, all else being equal, Bristol has greater capacity to 
deliver affordable housing than Plymouth. Despite both cities being at different ends 
of the spectrum in terms of contemporary economic buoyancy, both have adopted 
neoliberal competitive strategies with local cross-party political support to regenerate 
its deprived waterfront areas (as will be illustrated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Both 
cities have seen swings in political control over the period of the research, including 
the appointment of an elected mayor in Bristol. Political control in Plymouth has 
swung alternately between the Labour (1997-2000, 2003-07, 2012-15, 2018-) and 
Conservative parties (2000-03, 2007-12, 2017-18), with one period of no overall 
control (2015-17). In Bristol, since 1995, no overall political control has lasted 11 
years (2003-09, 2011-16), Labour control for ten years (1995-2003, 2016) and 
Liberal Democrats control for two years (2009-11).    
3.1 Plymouth  
With a population of 256,384 (Census, 2011), Plymouth is the second largest urban 
centre in southwest England after Bristol. The city developed as an important trading 
and defence port originally comprising the three coastal towns of Sutton (Harbour), 
Stonehouse and Devonport. Sutton Harbour has been a commercial trading port 
since 1281 (Essex and Ford, 2015), whilst Devonport developed around the Royal 
Dockyard from 1691 (Robinson, 2010). Like many industrial cities, Plymouth 
experienced urban decline during the twentieth century as new technologies, such 
as containerisation, caused trade to migrate to larger ports. Arguably, the focus on 
the reconstruction of the city centre after the Second World War detracted attention 
from changing conditions along the city’s waterfront. Defence reviews and the ‘peace 
dividend’ resulted in further job losses from the 1980s onwards. By the late twentieth 
century, much of Plymouth’s waterfront had become scarred by semi-derelict land 
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and buildings from former port, industrial and storage uses, or inaccessible due to 
military uses.   
The regeneration of Plymouth’s waterfront since the 1990s has been private sector-
led, albeit with considerable public sector support. Plymouth’s Urban Development 
Corporation (PUDC, 1994-98), as an example of ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism, focused on 
transforming former military and port sites to a point where the private sector were 
willing to invest in leisure, marinas and residential properties. While much of the 
redevelopment focused on more exclusive residential properties at Mount Batten 
(former Royal Airforce station) and the Royal William Yard (former Naval Victualling 
Yard), there were more community oriented schemes at Mount Wise (former Naval 
buildings). The outcomes of ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism were therefore spatially 
variegated across the city related to local circumstances and opportunities. The New 
Deal for Communities funding in Devonport (2001-11) focused on re-establishing a 
mixed community on the site of a Naval Storage Enclave requisitioned in 1952 on 
the site of the original town centre of Devonport. There was a deliberate emphasis in 
the regeneration scheme on building market housing to replace the post-war 
imbalance on social rented flats, which had been perceived as a fundamental part of 
the area’s socio-economic malaise. It might be argued that the inherent principles of 
this regeneration scheme had a clear purpose and rationale rather than being state-
led gentrification per se. Since 2010, the continued regeneration of Plymouth’s 
waterfront, such as Millbay and Sutton Harbour, has been subject to the vagaries of 
more recessionary conditions and associated development viability testing. 
Plymouth’s Local Development Framework (LDF) Core Strategy (PCC, 2007a, p. 11) 
set out David Mackay’s vision for Plymouth to become “one of Europe’s finest most 
vibrant waterfront cities where an outstanding quality of life is enjoyed by everyone”.  
The waterfront has therefore been at the forefront of Plymouth’s regeneration 
endeavours, and been central to the city’s attempts to establish a competitive edge 
through its branding as ‘Britain’s Ocean City’. The city’s vision statement and recent 
regeneration projects have, therefore, reflected the neoliberal emphasis of the 
competitive city, tinged with more progressive notions of social inclusion. 
Plymouth City Council’s (PCC) planning policies for mixed communities were set out 
in policy CS15 of the Core Strategy in 2007, which required at least 30% of homes 
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on sites of fifteen or more dwellings (including conversions) to be provided as on-site 
affordable housing units (PCC, 2007a). Plymouth’s new Joint Local Plan (PCC, 
2018, Policy DEV7) requires at least 30% on-site affordable housing on 
developments of more than ten homes, although off-site provision can be made for 
sites of 11-44 dwellings. Prior to 2007, the city’s planning policy for affordable 
housing was set out in the First Deposit Local Plan 1995-2011, which required 25% 
of new homes on developments of fifteen or more dwellings to be affordable housing 
units (PCC, 2001).  
3.2 Bristol 
Bristol is the eighth most populated city in England with 428,100 inhabitants 
(Census, 2011). Bristol began rapid expansion during the eighteenth century as it 
established itself as the leading port for the slave trade (Bassett, 2001). Until the 
early nineteenth century, Bristol’s trade was adversely affected by the second largest 
tidal range in the world with a difference of nine metres between low and high tide 
(Tallon, 2007). At low tide, ships would become stranded on the river bed. However, 
a dam was built at the beginning of the nineteenth century, turning the riverside 
wharves into a permanent body of water known as the ‘Floating Harbour.’ 
Nevertheless, ships increased in size during the nineteenth century and the 
meanders of the River Avon prevented vessels over 91 metres from accessing the 
floating docks. The Royal Edwards Dock and the Royal Portbury Dock were built at 
the mouth of the River Avon in 1908 and 1972 respectively and the Floating Harbour 
ceased commercial trading in 1977 (Bassett, 2001).  
Dockside warehouses and industrial land consequently became derelict leaving a 
significant amount of brownfield land (Tallon, 2007). These sites have been 
redeveloped into office, residential and cultural spaces since the late 1970s through 
interventions by an Urban Development Corporation (1989-1995) and an Enterprise 
Zone since 2012 as well as Millennium project funding for the @Bristol attraction 
(Bassett, et al., 2002). The city therefore has a long history of neoliberal 
interventions to lever in private investment, despite often clashing with the local 
authority’s principles of accountability and local participation (Oatley, 1993). The LDF 
Core Strategy (2011, p.16) was explicitly neoliberal, pro-growth and competitive in its 
vision for the city by 2026: “Our aspiration for Bristol is to be a leading European city 
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for innovative industry, enterprise, culture, environmental quality, lifestyle and urban 
design, reinforcing its status as a European Science City and Green Capital”. 
Notably, the emphasis of the vision in the Local Plan Review (2018) has changed to 
reflect more progressive notions of social justice (however illusionary) through 
shaping “…a city of hope and aspiration where everyone shares its success” (BCC, 
2018, p.6). 
Bristol City Council’s (BCC) planning policies for residential development are set out 
in policies BCS2, BCS17 and BCS20 of the LDF Core Strategy (BCC, 2011). 
Policies BCS2 and BCS20 encourage high density residential development in the 
city centre, including predominantly flats and townhouses in the Floating Harbour 
area. Policy BCS17 requires all residential developments of fifteen or more dwellings 
in the Floating Harbour area to provide 40% affordable housing to contribute to the 
creation of mixed, balanced and inclusive communities. Prior to the Core Strategy, 
the Local Plan (BCC, 1997) required 30% of homes on qualifying sites of fifteen or 
more dwellings (including conversions) to be delivered as affordable housing units. 
 
4.0 Methodology 
The research was conducted in the cities of Plymouth and Bristol between 
December 2016 and February 2017, combining quantitative and qualitative data 
collection. The criteria for selection of waterfront housing developments in the two 
cities were that sites must have direct physical and visual connectivity to the 
waterfront and must be within 100m of the water’s edge; must have planning 
permission for fifteen or more dwellings, which represented the threshold for  
affordable housing delivery in both research areas; must have secured planning 
permission since 2000 (when the mixed communities concept was adopted in 
planning policy); and must have been completed or be under construction at the time 
of undertaking the research. Using online planning registers for PCC and BCC, 
Google Maps, site visits and local knowledge, fifteen developments were identified in 
Plymouth and eleven in Bristol (Figures 1 and 2).  
To address the first two research objectives, the PCC and BCC online planning 
registers were used to collect secondary data on dwelling types, the proportion of 
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affordable housing, the gross density and the number of car parking spaces. The 
limitations of sourcing data from the PCC and BCC planning registers were that 
application documents were not available for all consents, particularly those granted 
in the early 2000s. Wherever possible, the researchers endeavoured to ascertain 
missing information through the subsequent interviews.  
Primary data collection focused on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholder 
groups to gain insights into the planning and development processes related to 
affordable housing provision. Twelve participants representing six organisations 
were interviewed (out of a possible 23 that were invited: 52 per cent) (Table 2). A 
cross-section of stakeholder groups, including LPA officers, developers, agents and 
politicians, were interviewed to understand the justification for the proportion of 
affordable housing delivered and the attitudes towards social mixing in waterfront 
regeneration areas. Neither residents nor community groups were invited to 
participate in interviews as these groups have limited involvement in affordable 
housing negotiations. While a representative sample was sought, many of the key 
stakeholders in Bristol declined to participate. As a result, no interviews were 
possible with developers, agents or planning officers from Bristol. Likewise, elected 
members were reluctant to participate - hence only a former politician was 
interviewed in relation to the Bristol sites. Some of the data were therefore inevitably 
slightly skewed towards Plymouth. 
The interviews revealed a degree of pathologising and stigmatising of certain groups 
by the respondents in relation to the regeneration issues discussed. For example, 
younger and transient tenants were problematised as a group with a propensity for 
noise, parties and anti-social behaviour, which would not mix well with other groups, 
especially the elderly and vulnerable communities. While these observations might 
reflect the experience of some respondents, anti-social behaviour is not the 
exclusive preserve of these groups. In another example, a respondent expressed the 
view that deprived areas should not receive further affordable housing, so that 
market housing investment could act as a trigger for regeneration. If this view 
influenced policy, it might consign low income groups to further hardship by 
constraining the supply of new affordable housing. These examples represent forms 
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of unconscious bias and potential discrimination from within the built environment 
professions, which might have the potential to create unequal power relations within 
the process and emphasises the importance of ethical values and awareness in 
professional practice. The principal researcher’s positionality as an employee of 
PCC’s Strategic Planning and Infrastructure Department had the potential to 
influence participant responses. There was a risk that participants from the 
development industry would answer questions in such a way as to please the 
interviewer and avoid revealing issues of commercial sensitivity. One of the 
developers indicated reservations about participating, whilst another was involved in 
affordable housing viability negotiations with the interviewer’s employer at the time of 
interviewing. The research received approval from the University of Plymouth’s 
Research Ethics Committee and the interviews followed the agreed protocol of 
providing full consent, ensuring confidentiality and the right to withdraw. None of the 
participants refused to answer questions or withdrew from an interview.  
5.0 Results and Analysis 
5.1 Composition of dwelling types in waterfront redevelopment 
A high-density approach to housing regeneration has been taken in the 15 Plymouth 
and 11 Bristol waterfront sites, especially in city centre locations. Flats represented 
70% of the new dwellings delivered across the Plymouth developments compared to 
at least 99% at the Floating Harbour site in Bristol (Tables 3 and 4). The dominance 
on flatted development was explained as a design response to the waterfront 
environment and by the developers’ requirement to achieve high GDV. House types 
were more flexible outside of the central locations, related to suburban housing 
markets and deliberate regeneration strategies in deprived communities.  
The results from both cities indicate that there has been a standard model of delivery 
for waterfront regeneration in central locations: namely mixed-use, high-rise and 
high-density apartment blocks with under-croft parking. Car parking provision in such 
locations is less than one space per dwelling linked to the need to maximise land use 
and the availability of convenient access to local transport options and amenities. In 
Bristol, the BCC Planning Officer and a former Bristol politician explained that high-
density flatted development was the appropriate land use at the Floating Harbour. 
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Houses were felt to be an inefficient form of development in an ‘urban renaissance’ 
environment. The former Bristol politician and the BCC HEO stated that the type of 
housing delivered at the Floating Harbour was influenced by the developers’ need to 
maximise GDVs to generate competitive land values sufficient to persuade 
landowners to part with their assets. When asked why developers were only seeking 
to build flats in the Floating Harbour area, the BCC HEO replied: 
“Viability. They [the developers] need to get to 5 or 6 storeys, which they cannot do 
in houses, and they don’t feel there is any value in maisonettes.” 
The PCC Planning Officer was asked the same question, but in relation to Sutton 
Harbour, the response was: 
“Sutton Harbour is [within the] city centre and because of the nature of the area, it 
has higher values. Therefore, they [developers] can afford to do something more 
expensive in that location.” 
The PCC Urban Designer added that the type of development at Sutton Harbour was 
partly an urban design response to the environment: 
“You’re facing a large area of open space – the water – so you can justify in urban 
design terms [building] taller buildings along the waterfront to frame and accentuate 
the harbour.” 
In Plymouth, the type of housing was more flexible outside of the city centre as 
demonstrated by the mix of flats and houses in Devonport and suburban Plymstock. 
In Devonport, houses represented 36% of the new dwellings, which was a deliberate 
regeneration strategy designed to reduce flatted developments and increase owner 
occupation as a response to the ‘problematic’ residential structure of the area before 
the New Deal for Communities programme. The Devonport Area Action Plan (AAP) 
(PCC, 2007b) stated that “existing housing in Devonport is unbalanced, being 
heavily biased towards social rented accommodation predominantly in the form of 
flats. This is not at present a sustainable community” (PCC, 2007b: p. 18). By 
completion of the Devonport regeneration scheme, it was envisaged that 60% of the 
new dwellings would be houses, whilst just 30% would be affordable housing units.   
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The PCC Urban Designer, PCC Cabinet Member and a Plymouth-based land agent 
agreed that the type of waterfront redevelopment at the Boatyard and Hooe Lake 
(Plymstock) was characteristic of suburban development. These interviewees stated 
that the demand for housing in suburban locations lies in the detached and semi-
detached house market. The land agent advised that: 
“[The developer’s] market research would have told them this [Plymstock] was 
suburbia. Suburbia demand lies with detached and semi-detached houses. […] You 
do see flatted schemes in the suburbs but, generally speaking, the best revenues 
are in the two or three bed house market unless [the site] is in a high value area, in 
which case it’s executive housing [that generates the greatest GDV]. Developers will 
always target what will give them the best revenue per square foot.” 
The land agent added that Plymstock was a relatively high value area for Plymouth, 
which encouraged the developer at the Boatyard to build executive housing. 
Nevertheless, in both cities, the high GDVs of waterfront locations had determined a 
more exclusive residential environment irrespective of whether that was in the form 
of high-rise apartments or suburban houses. 
 
5.2 Implementation mixed communities concept 
A total of 21% of dwellings delivered on the Plymouth sites were affordable 
compared to 11% in Bristol (Tables 3 and 4). Just five of the 26 sites across both 
research areas achieved policy levels of affordable housing, which suggests that the 
concept of mixed communities has not been implemented successfully in waterfront 
regeneration areas in both cities. If local planning policy is taken as a ‘benchmark’ of 
expected levels of affordable housing provision, then implementation should have 
been 25-30 per cent in Plymouth and 30-40 per cent in Bristol. The interview data 
revealed two interrelated reasons why policies for social mixing have not been 
implemented: (1) development viability linked to high development costs, planning 
policy and other political priorities; and (2) the prioritisation of accelerated delivery 
and economic growth over local planning policies.  
5.2.1 Development Viability: All participants stressed that waterfront sites tend to 
cost more to develop than inland sites due to abnormal development costs. These 
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costs include the mitigation of flood risk; remediation of ground contamination; 
strengthening of quay walls and made ground/reclaimed land; piling foundations 
down to the bedrock; using expensive and robust marine grade materials to weather 
extreme conditions; land assembly; archaeological/conservation considerations; and 
aligning terrestrial and marine planning processes. The historic nature of ports also 
ensures that there are often listed buildings that need to be preserved in waterfront 
locations, which adds to the costs of regeneration. Furthermore, multiple land 
ownership and historic covenants can complicate regeneration efforts, particularly 
related to site assembly. Developers have to negotiate with multiple owners and 
sometimes the LPA has to enforce Compulsory Purchase Orders, which are 
expensive and lead to delays and subsequent land holding costs.  
The characteristic high-rise apartment block type of waterfront regeneration also 
affects development viability. According to the PCC Urban Designer and the PCC 
Cabinet Member, the architectural response for high rise flats is usually expensive, 
including large windows to maximise the waterfront views, steel frame construction, 
high quality building materials and internal specifications and the need for piled 
foundations. Furthermore, a Plymouth-based land agent referred to the significant 
amount of communal space for lobbies, stairways and hallways that cannot be sold 
in apartment blocks, meaning that the developer recovers no revenue for around 
20% of the gross floor area: 
“High rise buildings with common areas are expensive to build. You’re only selling 
your net internal area and your gross to net margin might be 80% so you’re building 
20% of uneconomical wasted space that you don’t get any value for. If you’re 
building individual houses, the … scheme at the Boatyard for example, you’re 
building traditional housing which really ought to be cheaper to build as you’re not 
going high so you don’t need to worry about engineering stresses.” 
An investment company also suggested that apartment blocks are more difficult to 
fund than houses due to the greater sales risk, which results in increased interest 
rates and further challenges to viability: 
“[Building houses is] a better story for the bank in terms of their risk profile because 
you can phase houses or terraces for example to get money into the cash flow. To 
build an apartment block, you have to build all at once so there is a massive risk. 
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Hopefully you will sell homes at your PC [practical completion] date so the risk profile 
starts dropping off.” 
Landowners have an expectation that waterfront sites can generate high GDV, which 
means that developers often have to overpay for sites to provide a competitive offer, 
but are then also faced with the additional expenditures noted above. The result is a 
reduced budget for planning obligations, such as affordable housing. This finding 
was supported by the following interview extract with a major landowning company: 
“It is not correct to assume that all waterfront housing developments will necessarily 
be high value […] High sales values are often offset by high site redevelopment 
costs due to a range of factors such as the cost of moving existing infrastructure, the 
cost of archaeological investigation, site contamination issues, ground stability 
issues etc. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that high sales values automatically 
translate into high site values. Often scheme viability is much more marginal than is 
perceived and, if existing use values are to be exceeded, then scheme viability 
needs to be carefully modelled to ensure viability.” 
Development viability was given as the reason why the great majority of the 
developments in both research areas did not achieve policy levels of affordable 
housing. The four developments around Sutton Harbour failed to provide any on-site 
affordable housing due to viability. Instead, Eau 1 and Eau 2 provided a commuted 
sum of £109,030 to enable the LPA to deliver affordable housing off-site. In relation 
to Discovery Wharf, the land agent working on behalf of the developer stated: 
“It was viability again. It was the first of its ilk in terms of new build housing on Sutton 
Harbour. Back then, Discovery Wharf only just achieved £200 per square foot [in 
GDV]. It was the first scheme in Plymouth that achieved £200 per square foot. The 
argument led by the developer was that it was a risk. Nobody knew what the demand 
levels were going to be as it was the first one to be built at that time. Costs were 
high, building on a quayside on the waterfront. There were ground conditions that 
precluded any form of affordable housing. Also, affordable housing couldn’t have 
been delivered on this site as there would have been issues with service charges 
from the swimming pool: so clearly, affordable housing wouldn’t have sat very 
comfortably in terms of viability in service charge terms. I think build costs did 
exceed their predictions.” 
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These considerations relate to the development economics of waterfront 
regeneration. However, the effect of the neoliberalisation of planning is evident in 
changed planning guidance from central government over negotiations about the 
extent of affordable housing, which has shifted in favour of the developers.  PCC 
HDO1 explained how the NPPF had made affordable housing delivery challenging in 
Plymouth. There are two parts to this discussion: the first part regarding 
development viability and the second part relating to the requirement to maintain a 
five-year land supply.  
The guidance of the original NPPF requires LPAs to be flexible when requiring 
planning obligations to ensure that developers and landowners achieve competitive 
returns on development. The interview data revealed that development appraisals 
were not undertaken in either Plymouth or Bristol until the NPPF was published in 
2012. According to PCC HDO1, the NPPF has resulted in virtually all developments 
in Plymouth being subjected to viability appraisals with all developers seeking to 
reduce planning obligations for affordable housing on both waterfront and inland 
sites. PCC HDO1 stated that prior to the NPPF, planning applications either provided 
policy levels of affordable housing or permission was refused. LPAs had flexibility to 
negotiate the level of affordable housing where planning officers agreed that there 
were significant abnormal impacts. PCC HDO1 therefore felt that, whilst there were 
abnormal costs at the Boatyard and Hooe Lake, both sites should have been able to 
deliver 30% affordable housing given the relatively high value nature of housing in 
Plymstock. Instead, these sites delivered 9% and 15% affordable housing because 
of reported threats to viability claimed by developers caused by abnormal costs 
associated with reinforcing quarry and quay walls, remediating contaminated land at 
a derelict scrapyard and providing access to the site.  
Similarly, in Bristol, all of the interviewees agreed (independently) that viability had 
undermined BCC’s capacity to deliver affordable housing. The BCC Planning Officer 
and HEO explained how viability had enabled developers to use the purchase price 
as the site value in viability appraisals. Developers were therefore able to overpay for 
sites without having due consideration for local planning policies on the basis that 
they could reduce affordable housing obligations based on viability. The BCC HEO 
stated that the developers for the Huller and Cheese and the Eye sites overpaid for 
the land and consequently secured planning permission with nil on-site affordable 
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housing. The BCC HEO stated that, for the General Hospital site, the developer was 
able to use the £6m purchase price as the site value for viability testing instead of 
the alternative residential use value, which was far greater. The 205 town houses 
and apartments at the General Hospital are now selling for between £325,000 and 
£1,250,000 per dwelling, generating significant GDVs. 
Elsewhere in Bristol, the Great Western Dock development delivered 5.5% 
affordable housing due to the political requirement to provide the SS Great Britain 
World Heritage Museum. The BCC HEO advised that the developer argued to create 
a £2 million dowry to help fund the museum and provide an income. Viability linked 
to other political requirements therefore prevented the Great Western Dock site from 
achieving policy levels of affordable housing. Other sites across Bristol have secured 
reduced levels of affordable housing to prioritise other planning obligations: for 
example, the Metrobus link at Wapping Wharf and the restoration of a listed building 
at Finzel’s Reach.  
These observations have some significant implications. The original NPPF has 
enabled developers to deftly side step affordable housing obligations based on 
development viability. It is not clear whether developers overpay for sites to negate 
such obligations or whether they need to overpay to persuade landowners to sell 
their assets, but the implication is that sites were not acquired in full consideration of 
local planning policies. Either way, the neoliberalised planning system in England is 
configured in a way that ensures that it is bound to fail in terms of creating mixed 
communities because of such provisions to enable developers to avoid policy-
compliant development. The former Bristol politician stated: 
“[As a politician] I was passionate about it [affordable housing] but I couldn’t [deliver 
it] as I had strategic planning powers but no planning control powers. The law is 
against you [as LPAs] and this is what militates against British affordable housing. 
The formula for getting affordable housing is blown out of the water by the loopholes 
that exist that allow you to take into account the price of the land. The price of the 
land should be irrelevant as whatever you paid for the price of the land, you paid for 
it knowing the requirement of 30-40% affordable housing.” 
5.2.2 Accelerated Delivery: As a response to the 2008 recession, the government 
has introduced measures within the NPPF and the General Permitted Development 
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(England) Order 2015 (GPDO) that prioritise growth over development that complies 
with local development plans. Consequently, LPAs have had reduced power to 
refuse permission and achieve ‘planning gain’ from new development, such as 
affordable housing, and so represents an example of the temporal shifts with the 
neoliberalisation of planning. 
The NPPF requires LPAs to identify and maintain a five-year supply of housing.  
Policies for the supply of housing are considered to be out-of-date where LPAs 
cannot demonstrate a five year supply of housing. LPAs are required to approve 
planning applications without delay where relevant policies are out-of-date, unless 
the adverse impacts of allowing development would significantly and demonstrably 
outweigh the benefits. Unlike the pre-2012 plan-led planning system, in which 
applications were determined in accordance to the development plan unless material 
considerations indicated otherwise, the NPPF requires LPAs to approve applications 
unless there is a significant degree of harm that would be caused by granting 
permission. According to PAS (2014), 46% of LPAs did not have a five-year land 
supply, which made it difficult for LPAs to refuse planning permission for housing 
developments. The implication is that applications that do not provide policy levels of 
affordable housing have been granted planning permission on the basis of an 
unintended consequence of another government policy. 
In Plymouth, the development at the Boatyard was initially considered for refusal by 
PCC, on the grounds of a change of use from employment to residential use and the 
failure to comply with policy CS15 for affordable housing. However, PCC HDO1 
advised that PCC reluctantly granted planning permission on the basis that it feared 
it would lose if the decision was appealed due to the NPPF’s presumption in favour 
of sustainable development and the absence of a five-year land supply.  
The BCC HEO added concerns over the GPDO, which enables developers to 
convert office to residential space without the need for planning permission. This 
order prevents LPAs from securing planning obligations for affordable housing. The 
GDPO presents a significant challenge to affordable housing delivery in Bristol, 
where there is an abundance of waterfront office space around the Floating Harbour. 
Permitted development is another example of how the national planning system 
over-privileges developers and landowners.  
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Political agendas have undermined the ability of LPAs to secure planning obligations 
for affordable housing and that such drivers will continue to present challenges in the 
future. Nevertheless, the study revealed three exceptions where mixed communities 
policies have been implemented: (1) on public land; (2) where public subsidy is 
provided; and (3) on large sites. The effect of neoliberalisation of planning within the 
same city is uneven and can produce spatial variegation based on public 
landownership, government subsidy and/or plot size. 
5.2.3 Exceptions: Analysis of the amount of affordable housing delivered on public 
sites shows that nine of the fifteen Plymouth developments and three of the eleven 
Bristol developments were on publicly owned sites (Table 5). At first glance, 
Plymouth appears to have delivered a much greater proportion of affordable housing 
(21% as opposed to Bristol’s 11% across all sites). However, further analysis reveals 
that, on publicly owned sites, Plymouth and Bristol delivered 25% and 27% 
affordable housing respectively. Just 2% of the dwellings delivered on privately 
owned sites were affordable housing units in both cities. A total of 91% of the 
affordable housing units delivered in Plymouth were on publicly owned sites 
compared to 85% in Bristol. The amount of affordable housing delivered on public 
and privately owned sites is therefore remarkably similar in both study areas, which 
suggests that land ownership has a significant impact upon the amount of affordable 
housing delivered and upon the ability to deliver mixed communities. 
The second exception where social mixing policies have been implemented is when 
significant public subsidy is provided. Public funding does not guarantee that 
affordable house can be delivered. Thus, the Royal William Yard development did 
not deliver any affordable housing despite receiving significant PUDC infrastructure 
investment. However, the Phoenix Quay, Cargo and Cargo 2 developments 
demonstrate that significant abnormal development costs were offset by significant 
HCA investment in the form of public land and subsidy, which delivered policy levels 
of affordable housing. 
As joint ventures between RPs and private developers, the Pottery Quay and Gun 
Wharf developments in Devonport were unique in that they were the only 
developments in both cities to deliver above policy levels of affordable housing with 
47% and 64% respectively. The use of public land enabled a best value, rather than 
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maximum value, approach to be adopted in the use of land. PCC HDO1 stated that 
these sites were the first developments in the regeneration of Devonport and, 
because both sites were regarded as “notorious no go areas”, there was little 
confidence in the developers’ ability to sell market units. However, the significant 
local demand for rented affordable housing together with the availability of public 
subsidy for this provision enabled the developers to deliver properties of this type. 
PCC HDO1 and PCC HDO2 also advised that the amount of affordable housing was 
influenced by the obligation to rehouse tenants that wanted to return to the estates 
having been rehoused temporarily to enable demolition. Therefore, unlike the other 
developments, which secured consent with reduced amounts of affordable housing, 
the provision was increased at Gun Wharf and Pottery Quay to attract public funding 
and mitigate the sales risk on the market homes.  
The third exception is on large sites of three or more hectares. A total of five of the 
26 developments across both cities were larger than three hectares with each site 
delivering at least 190 homes. These sites were Mount Wise (10.5 ha) and Hooe 
Lake (5.5 ha) in Plymouth and Canon’s Marsh (7.0 ha), Finzel’s Reach (4.4 ha) and 
Wapping Wharf (3.6 ha) in Bristol. The scale of these sites ensured that there were 
desirable and less desirable parts which enabled the inclusion of 15% affordable 
housing. A Plymouth-based land agent stated that: 
“If you’ve got large regeneration areas, economies of scale kick in and you also have 
areas of land that aren’t as prime as others and it’s these sorts of areas that allow 
affordable housing to be delivered.” 
 
5.3 Attitudes and approaches to social mixing on waterfront regeneration sites 
across four stakeholder groups involved in the planning and development 
process 
The consensus across all four stakeholder groups was that social mixing is a 
worthwhile ambition and morally the right thing to do, but that there is some conflict 
over whether planning policies are a practical way to implement mixed communities 
in waterfront regeneration areas. The interview data revealed three additional 
challenges to delivering mixed communities (aside from development viability linked 
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to development costs), which are: (1) viability linked to housing management issues; 
(2) service charges and rents; and (3) the wider aims of regeneration. While these 
issues are well-known in managing market housing alongside affordable properties, 
they represent additional considerations for developers when formulating 
development proposals. 
5.3.1 Viability and Housing Management Issues: According to some interviewees 
from both the public and private sector, the integration of affordable housing can 
reduce the value of market homes on mixed tenure developments. The investment 
company stated that one of the first questions asked by prospective purchasers was 
the location of the affordable housing units. Where tenures are mixed across a 
development, the value of the properties on either side of affordable houses can be 
reduced in value. Integrated affordable housing has an even greater effect on blocks 
of flats, where one affordable unit can affect the value of all of the apartments.  
The PCC HDO2 explained some of the housing management issues that can arise in 
developments with mixed communities: 
“From a housing management perspective, flats are seen as a management risk as 
they are [associated with] younger, transient [tenants and are prone to] parties and 
anti-social behaviour. So flats are seen as more of a problem. Planning policy 
doesn’t reflect that allocations are made under the Housing Act, which is based on 
need. So flats for one and two bed [households] can be occupied by vulnerable 
people or older persons with health problems and vulnerability so you start mixing 
people with complicated needs in with people wanting luxurious lifestyles and the 
two don’t go together.” 
A key principle of mixed communities is that private and affordable properties should 
be distributed throughout a development and be indistinguishable and tenure blind. 
However, an investment company raised a housing management issue at Mount 
Wise, where the registered provider had refused to participate in ongoing 
maintenance programmes on the estate. Private owners and most of the shared 
ownership occupants are signed up to a maintenance programme, whereby homes 
are cleaned and painted and the parapets and drainage systems are cleared 
regularly. The registered provider would not sign up to this programme, meaning that 
the affordable housing units are not cleaned and, as a consequence, stand out from 
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the market homes. The affordable homes may therefore be identified contrary to 
policy CS15 of Plymouth’s Core Strategy (PCC, 2007a), which states that such 
dwellings should be tenure blind and indivisible from market units. The registered 
provider’s refusal to maintain its properties detracts from the quality of the 
environment and subsequent sales values. 
5.3.2 Service Charges and Rents: There was a consensus amongst participants 
that high service charges in waterfront apartment blocks make it difficult to 
accommodate affordable housing in such buildings. In addition to development 
viability, high service charges were given as a reason why Discovery Wharf could 
not support affordable housing. A Plymouth-based land agent stated: 
“There is that issue of affordable housing and service charges in luxury buildings 
which are designed for the waterfront. Discovery Wharf is a classic example – great 
big foyers, swimming pool, gymnasium, a concierge service, two lift shafts, which are 
all paid for by the resident’s service charges. So not only is it [on-site affordable 
housing delivery] unviable, but the service charge is unaffordable in affordable 
housing terms to maintain facilities. If you look at [the] affordable rent [tenure] now, 
the service charge needs to be deducted from the rent received so that would create 
an even greater gap.”  
Both PCC and BCC use Section 106 agreements to cap service charges to £572 
and £550 pa (for the 2016/17 year) respectively (except in supported housing 
schemes). However, a major landowning and development company advised that a 
typical service charge at Eau 1 or Eau 2 is in the region of £2,000-£2,500 pa (up to 
£208.33 per calendar month (pcm)). The affordable rent tenure requires service 
charges to be included within the rent, which cannot exceed 80% of the value of the 
market rent. At the time of writing, the rent on a two bedroom flat at Sutton Harbour 
was around £1,000 pcm (around £1,208.33 pcm with the service charge), which is 
significantly higher than the £530.23 local housing allowance (housing benefit) rate, 
creating an affordability gap that would need to be met by the tenant. Therefore, the 
rent and service charges ensure that flats in city centre waterfront locations are not 
truly affordable to those in housing need. 
However, four of the interviewees did suggest how social mixing can work in 
waterfront apartment blocks. The BCC HEO, PCC HDO1, a major landowning/ 
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development company and a land agent discussed the use of ‘poor doors.’ It is 
possible to build two entrances with the affordable housing units occupying a number 
of whole floors, or to build a separate block for the affordable homes. The separate 
blocks/floors can be tenure blind with the areas containing the affordable homes 
being more basic to reduce service charges. For example, the affordable units could 
be situated on the lower floors within a block so there is no requirement for a lift. For 
a scheme in Bristol, the BCC HEO agreed to the developer providing two lifts with 
one servicing the market homes and the other servicing the affordable units. 
However, these options effectively segregate the affordable and market units and 
therefore the concept of poor doors remains socially and politically controversial. 
5.3.3 Regeneration Aims: As the purpose of urban regeneration is to produce a 
lasting improvement to an area, it was perceived by some respondents that social 
problems could not be resolved without increasing the proportion of market housing. 
This process has been referred to by critics as state-led gentrification. In relation to 
Devonport, the PCC HDO1 stated: “if a whole area is poor to begin with, then it’s 
good to have no affordable housing. It’s a trigger for regeneration”. All of the 
interviewees agreed that, whilst the four Sutton Harbour developments are exclusive 
on an individual site basis, they have complemented the existing stock of socially 
rented flats and so created a mix of house types and tenures at a broader 
neighbourhood scale.  
 
6.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
Using the implementation of planning policy to encourage mixed communities and 
affordable housing in two English waterfront cities, Bristol and Plymouth, this paper 
has sought to assess the ability of a neoliberalised English planning system to 
negotiate planning obligations with developers and to deliver ‘public goods’ through 
land value capture. It was apparent that there is a standard ‘model’ of delivery for 
inner city waterfront regeneration, namely high-rise, high density apartment blocks 
with little to no affordable housing, which had been influenced by urban renaissance 
design considerations, developers’ need to achieve high GDVs, and facilitated by 
viability tests and the requirement for five-year land supplies under a neoliberalised 
planning regime. The type of housing delivered outside city centre locations was 
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more flexible and could contain a mix of flats and houses. Despite house prices 
being 57% higher in Bristol than Plymouth, the planning outcome in terms of the 
deliverability of affordable housing on privately owned sites is virtually identical (in 
policy terms, 30-40% and in construction terms, 11-21%). This finding suggests a 
failure of land value capture, because of the priority given to delivery of economic 
growth through new housing, the viability loophole and the reliance on market 
mechanisms (both in relation to the land and housing development market). 
The ability of planning to deliver public goods has clearly been affected detrimentally 
because of issues related to development viability and political priorities to deliver 
economic growth. The challenges of development viability of waterfront sites, such 
as the requirement to remediate contaminated land, mitigate flood risk and to 
strengthen made or reclaimed land, often require the reduction of planning 
obligations. Issues associated with housing management, the stigma attached to 
affordable housing, unaffordable rents and service charges, and the wider socials 
aims of urban regeneration also add to the viability challenge for developers in these 
locations. Whilst the creation of mixed communities is equitably the right thing to 
aspire, social mixing is not always practical in reality. 
The interview data from across all stakeholder groups confirmed that waterfront 
development tends to be more expensive and technically complicated than that in 
inland areas. Developers and landowners are understandably entitled to make a 
reasonable financial return from the development process. However, the tendency 
for developers to acquire sites at a value that does not regard development plan 
policies/obligations highlights structural issues within the planning system at a 
national scale in England. The original NPPF stated that planning obligations, such 
as those for affordable housing, should be sufficiently flexible to prevent 
development from becoming stalled. The NPPF has enabled almost all landowners 
and developers, who are better resourced than LPAs (Hill, 2015), to reduce the 
quantity of affordable housing through viability discussions. One interpretation might 
be that the planning system is inadvertently encouraging landowners to enhance 
land values in the knowledge that developers can overpay for sites and then reduce 
planning obligations through negotiation. Developers’ profit margins are also 
protected through these viability negotiations. 
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Ultimately, the planning system is in place to guide sustainable development that 
accords with the development plan, which has been subjected to public consultation 
and examination, and so to deliver in the public interest. The original NPPF enables 
developers to dodge the obligation to provide affordable housing via viability 
negotiations and/or where a LPA cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of housing. 
Developers are therefore implementing development that is contrary to the 
development plan without the need to consult the public (other than the statutory 
consultation required on all planning applications). In some cases where the GDPO 
applies, developers do not need planning permission at all. If development proposals 
that were contrary to the local development plan were refused, developers would 
have no choice but to pay a site value that has regard to the local planning policies. 
The fact that developers can secure planning permission for proposals that are 
contrary to local development plans undermines civic trust in LPAs and in the 
legitimacy of the planning system itself. National planning policy since 2012 has 
therefore put the power in the hands of the developers and landowners who control 
the land supply for development. These conclusions illustrate the subtle and often 
hidden outcomes for cities and their populations from the neoliberalisation of 
planning even if these effects are temporary – accentuated by recessionary 
conditions and political drivers to encourage economic growth – and spatially 
variable being experienced more acutely in favoured cities or locations within cities. 
This point highlights the experimental and adaptive influence of neoliberalism in 
planning and illustrates its spatial, temporal and sectoral variegation. 
The exception to these findings was where public land or subsidy has been made 
available to deliver affordable housing and on larger sites of three of more hectares. 
About 91% and 85% of the affordable housing in the waterfront regeneration 
schemes of Plymouth and Bristol respectively was on public land. Just 2% of the 
homes delivered on privately procured sites were affordable in both cities. Land 
ownership has a significant impact on the ability of LPAs to implement planning 
policies to create mixed communities. In Devonport (Plymouth), where 75% of the 
pre-regeneration homes were socially rented (PCC, 2007b), it would have not have 
been socially equitable to replace affordable housing with executive flats for affluent 
households. Similarly, it would not have been sustainable to add a significant amount 
of affordable housing to Sutton Harbour (Plymouth), which already contained high 
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levels of socially rented flats in the area. In these circumstances and locations, local 
authorities have the ability to be disruptive to the ‘post-political’ tendencies of 
neoliberalism by delivering alternative pathways through the utilisation of their own 
landownership assets. 
In order to deliver mixed communities, LPAs might be allowed to take a more 
assertive and interventionist approach to land assembly by utilising public assets to 
deliver public benefit. If affordable housing cannot be mixed with market properties in 
waterfront locations, then public authorities might identify sites which they own or 
control and then seek to maximise off-site contributions from developers for social 
infrastructure on an appropriate scale. However, in a recessionary environment, 
these objectives are likely to prove politically contentious and almost intractable. 
Under these circumstances, planning has acquired a reduced capacity to deliver 
public good, such as mixed communities, because of the political priorities for 
economic growth which have allowed developers to negate planning obligations on 
the basis of development viability. By enabling developers to avoid policy-compliant 
development, the basis of urban land use policy has been fundamentally 
transformed.  
These circumstances would point to a need for some rebalancing of power in the 
planning system. The new NPPF (July, 2018) is trying to shift discussions about 
viability to the plan and policy making stage in setting realistic parameters for 
affordable housing contributions and undertaking viability assessments at the 
planning application stage (Soloman, 2018). The National Audit Office (2019) have 
also recognised that developers have been re-negotiating lower contributions on the 
grounds of financial viability and, while reforms were underway, these would take 
several years to implement. These government statements are tacit acceptance that 
developers have indeed been ‘gaming’ the system against LPAs, who do not 
generally have the knowledge or expertise to rebut developers’ claims. It also 
represents the clearest possible evidence that the influence of neoliberalisation on 
planning is both ‘experimental’ and variegated temporally. The MHCLG (2018, p.7) 
recognise that landowners currently retain around 50 percent of the increase in land 
value arising from planning permission, which is necessary to provide relevant public 
infrastructure and services, but that there is scope to claim a greater proportion of 
the land value through the reform of mechanisms. 
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Table 1. Hypotheses about problems of concentrated poverty and the desired 
benefits of mixed communities.  
Assumed area effects of 
concentrations of poverty 
Assumed benefits of living in a mixed 
community and/or creating mixed 
communities 
Arising from lack of resources: 
 Absence of private sector 
facilities including shops and 
banks 
 High demands on poor quality 
public services 
 Poor reputation 
 High crime and anti-social 
behaviour 
 
Arising from more resources: 
 More money to support facilities 
 Improved services, particularly 
schools 
 Improved reputation 
 Fewer residents with motivation 
for crime and anti-social 
behaviour 
Arising from limited interaction between 
social groups: 
 Exposure to disaffected peer 
groups 
 Isolation from job-finding or 
health-promoting networks of 
adults 
Arising from greater interaction between 
social groups: 
 Exposure to aspirational peer 
groups 
 Access to more advantaged and 
aspirational social groups and 
networks 
Source: DCLG (adapted from 2010: p. 16) 
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Table 2. Participating interviewees/organisations. 
Plymouth Bristol 
LPA officers 
PCC Planning Officer BCC Former Planning Officer 
PCC Urban Designer BCC Housing Enabling Officer (HEO) 
PCC Housing Delivery Officer 1 (HDO1)  
PCC Housing Delivery Officer 2 (HDO2)  
Developers 
Investment Company None 
Major landowning and development 
company 
 
Agents 
Land Agent None 
Politicians 
PCC Cabinet Member Former Politician 
 BCC Cabinet Member (written 
responses) 
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Table 3. Results from the desktop analysis of Plymouth developments.  
Area Development Number 
of 
dwellings 
Car parking 
spaces 
(spaces per 
dwelling) 
Gross 
density 
(dwellings 
per ha) 
Dwelling 
types 
Percentage 
of dwellings 
that are 
houses 
Percentage of 
dwellings that 
are affordable 
(and the 
policy at the 
time of 
securing the 
consent) 
Sutton 
Harbour 
Discovery 
Wharf 
59 53 (90%) 323 59 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Eau 1 
 
56 53 (95%) 130 56 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Eau 2 
 
37 Not known 185 37 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Queen 
Anne’s Quay 
38 Not known 109 (329 
net) 
38 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Millbay, 
Stonehouse 
Phoenix Quay 123 114 (93%) 138 32 houses 
& 91 flats 
26% 25% (25%) 
Cargo 
 
134 124 (93%) 300 134 flats 0% 25% (25%) 
Cargo 2 48 42 (88%) 106 14 houses 
& 34 flats 
29% 25% (25%) 
Quadrant 
Quay 
102 110 (108%) 169 15 houses 
& 87 flats 
15% 10% (30%) 
Royal 
William 
Yard, 
Stonehouse 
Mills Bakery 
 
78 65 (87%) 120 78 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Brewhouse 
and Clarence 
Buildings 
133 134 (101%) 81 133 flats 0% 0% (25%) 
Devonport 
Pottery Quay 203 Not known 119 53 houses 
& 150 flats 
26% 47% (25%) 
Gun Wharf 99 99 (100%) 53 82 houses 
& 17 flats 
82% 65% (25%) 
Mount Wise 450 508 (113%) 43 139 
houses & 
311 flats 
31% 22% (25%) 
Plymstock 
Hooe Lake 190 400 (211%) 34 169 
houses & 
21 flats 
89% 15% (30%) 
The Boatyard 53 
 
132 (249%) 32 53 houses 100% 9% (30%) 
Total 
1,803 1,834 
(120%)1  
119 
(median) 
537 
houses 
(30%) & 
1,246 flats 
(70%) 
30% 21% 
Source: Authors (2017). 
11,834 car parking spaces for the 1,525 dwellings for which the number of spaces was determined. The number 
of spaces could not be obtained for Eau 2 and Queen Anne’s Quay. This level of parking equates to 120% 
provision across thirteen sites. 
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Table 4. Results from the desktop analysis of Bristol’s developments.  
Development Number 
of 
dwellings 
Car parking 
spaces (spaces 
per dwelling) 
Gross density 
(dwellings per 
ha) 
Dwelling types Percentage of 
dwellings that are 
affordable (and the 
policy at the time of 
securing the 
consent) 
Queen Street 
Apartments 
34 Not known 282 All flats 15% (30%) 
Canon’s Marsh 688 Not known 98 All flats 17% (30%) 
The Eye 108 Not known 3190 All flats 0% (30%) 
SACO Apartments 160 20 (13%) 5461 All flats 19% (30%) 
Temple Bridge 
Apartments 
22 Not known 756 All flats 0% (30%) 
Finzel’s Reach 398 Not known 90 All flats 23% (30%) 
Great Western 
Dock 
145 80 (55%) 296 All flats 5.5% (30%) 
Huller and Cheese 55 25 (45%) 406 All flats 0% (40%) 
Redcliffe Parade 
West 
30 21 (70%) 167 All flats 0% (40%) 
Wapping Wharf 523 279 (53%) 147 502 flats & 21 x 
townhouses  and 
duplex/triplex 
apartments 
19% (30%) 
General Hospital 205 148 (72%) 165 195 flats & 10 
houses 
0% (40%) 
Total 2,368 573 (51%)1 282 (median) 
 
99% flats 11% 
Source: Authors (2017). 
1573 car parking spaces for the 1,118 dwellings for which the number of spaces was determined. The number of 
spaces could not be obtained for Queen Square Apartments, Canon’s Marsh, the Eye, Temple Bridge 
Apartments or Finzel’s Reach. The level of parking equates to 51% across the six sites where parking levels 
were ascertained. 
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Table 5. Analysis of affordable housing delivery on publicly owned waterfront 
regeneration sites.  
 Plymouth Bristol 
Total number of dwellings 
consented on qualifying 
development 
1,803 2,407 
Total affordable housing 
units 
379 (21%) 253 (11%) 
Land ownership at time of 
securing planning 
permission 
9 publically owned sites (60%) 
5 privately owned sites (40%) 
3 publically owned sites (30%) 
7 privately owned sites (70%) 
Number of dwellings on sites 
that were publically owned 
1,370 796 
Number of affordable 
housing units on sites that 
were publically owned 
345 (25%) 215 (27%) 
Number of dwellings on sites 
that were privately owned 
1,458 1,611 
Number of affordable 
housing units on sites that 
were privately owned 
34 (2%) 38 (2%) 
Source: Authors (2017). 
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Figure 1. Location of Plymouth waterfront regeneration sites. The fifteen 
Plymouth developments are spread across the neighbourhoods of Devonport, 
Millbay and Stonehouse, Sutton Harbour and Plymstock.  
 
 
Figure 2. Location of Bristol waterfront regeneration sites. All eleven of the sites 
fall within Bristol’s central area as defined by the BCC Central Area Plan (BCC, 
2015). 
